Recent Cases by Editors,
[Vol.108
RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-EMPLOYEES' PROFIT SHARING TRUST HELD
OUTSIDE PURVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY ACT SECTION 4(a)
The management company for a large number of cemetery corporations
created a profit sharing trust fund for the benefit of its employees. The
trust agreement provided that title to trust assets would be registered in the
name of the trust, but gave to the trustees powers in relation to the assets
similar to those which an individual might exercise over his own property.'
It also purported to limit the trustees' personal liability to willful dereliction
and gross negligence,2 contemplated perpetual existence,3 and forbade the
issuance of transferable shares to the beneficiaries. Employee-beneficiaries
were accorded rights limited to electing some of the trustees and designating
a recipient for any earned benefit not distributed at the time of the em-
ployee's death. The trustees acquired stock of seventeen corporations,
voted and encumbered the shares, and had contracted to purchase others.
Subsequently, several trustees filed a petition under the federal Bank-
ruptcy Act.4 The referee entered an order adjudicating the trust bankrupt,
but the district court set it aside and dismissed the petition.5 The court of
appeals, affirming, held that a mere private trust fund was not entitled to the
benefits of the act. Associated Cemetery Management, Inc. v. Barnes,
268 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1959).
Determination of who may become a voluntary bankrupt requires
correlation of three sections of the Bankruptcy Act. Section 4(a) provides
that any person, with certain exceptions, may file a voluntary petition.6
"Person" is defined to include "corporations" 7 which in turn is used as a
word of art pertaining to any body with form of organization or extent of
powers sufficiently similar to a corporation to warrant corporate treatment
under the act.8 Judicial gloss of the terms has permitted divers hybrid
'Record, p. 26, Associated Cemetery Management, Inc. v. Barnes, 268 F.2d 97
(8th Cir. 1959).
2 Id. at 29.
3 Id. at 33.
430 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1958).
5 I. re Associated Cemetery Management, Inc., 170 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Mo.
1958).
652 Stat. 845 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §22(a) (1958).
752 Stat 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §1(23) (1958).
8 " 'Corporation' shall include all bodies having any of the powers and privileges
of private corporations not possessed by individuals or partnerships and shall include
partnership associations organized under laws making the capital subscribed alone
responsible for the debts of the association, joint-stock companies, unincorporated
companies and associations, and any business conducted by a trustee or trustees
wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced by certificate or other written
instrument." 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1958).
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associations 9 to be adjudicated bankrupt."' However, despite the broad
construction given the definition of corporation, the ordinary trust fund
has been held not amenable to federal bankruptcy proceedings. 1 In the
instant case petitioner attempted to prove that the employees' profit sharing
trust in question was not an ordinary trust but rather an entity endowed
with enough corporate trappings to be encompassed by the "corporation"
terminology elucidated by prior federal bankruptcy cases.
In order to discover whether this profit sharing trust was the type of
entity contemplated by the Bankruptcy Act,' 2 the court examined the
settlement agreement to ascertain the purposes of the trust, the powers and
duties of its trustees, and the rights of the beneficiaries. In construing one
phrase in the definition of "corporation"--"unincorporated companies and
associations" '3 -the court, ignoring the effect of state law,14 took as its
9 See In re Poland Union, 77 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1935), modified sub nom. First
Nat'l Bank v. Poland Union, 101 F.2d 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 682 (1940)
(cooperative store) ; It re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 638 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 584 (1922) (informal nonprofit association to expedite wartime coal
shipments); In re Order of Sparta, 242 Fed. 235 (3d Cir. 1917) (fraternal group
providing insurance benefits) ; In re Philadelphia Consistory, 40 F. Supp. 645 (E.D.
Pa. 1941), aff'd per curiam, 134 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1943) (fraternal organization) ;
In re Minnesota Ins. Underwriters, 36 F.2d 371 (D. Minn. 1929) (reciprocal insurance
exchange) ; In re Carthage Lodge, 230 Fed. 694 (N.D.N.Y. 1916) (fraternal organi-
zation); In re Associated Trust, 222 Fed. 1012 (D. Mass. 1914) (Massachusetts
trust) ; In re Seaboard Fire Underwriters, 137 Fed. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1905) (Lloyds
insurance company). But see In re Lloyds of Texas, 43 F.2d 383 (N.D. Tex. 1930)
(Lloyds insurance company). See also notes 10, 13 infra.
10 The above cases were all involuntary petitions which were decided on the
basis of § 4(b). See note 13 infra. In discussing the phrases "any unincorporated
company" and "unincorporated companies and associations" contained in § 1(8), the
court in Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1941),
expressed doubt as to whether there was any substantial difference between the two.
Id. at 136.
11 Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, supra note 10.
' 2 Appellant's first contention, instant case at 101, was that the agreement created
a Massachusetts Trust and came within the coverage of the words "any business
conducted by a trustee or trustees wherein beneficial interest or ownership is evidenced
by certificate or other written instrument." See note 8 stpra; H.R. REP. No. 877,
69th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1926). It is usual for these trusts to issue transferable
equitable shares, Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 147 (1924), and inasmuch as the
trust agreement in question specifically prohibited such issuance, the court concluded
that the statutory language was too explicit to allow for this categorization. Instant
case at 101-02.
13 The words "unincorporated company and association" were added to the defi-
nition of corporation in 1926. Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, 44 Stat. 662. Inasmuch
as this term follows the word "include" which has been interpreted as implying flexi-
bility, In re Harper, 175 Fed. 412, 423 (N.D.N.Y. 1910), it would seem that the term
is merely illustrative of the type of body amenable under § 4(a). Until 1938, § 4(b),
on involuntary bankruptcy, contained the provision that "any unincorporated com-
pany" might be adjudicated a bankrupt Act of July 1, 1898, § 4(b), ch. 541, 30 Stat.
547. These words were deleted from § 4(b) when the addition was made to the
definition of "corporation." 52 Stat 845 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §22(b) (1958).
14 Several courts have construed the nature of the subject matter of the pro-
ceedings in light of state law. See In re Carthage Lodge, 230 Fed. 694 (N.D.N.Y.
1916) (fraternal lodge organized under New York law); In re Associated Trust,
222 Fed. 1012, 1013 (D. Mass. 1914) (Massachusetts trust). Others discuss state
law but seem to decide the nature and attributes of the subject matter on the basis
of the words of the Bankruptcy Act and federal precedent alone. See, e.g., In re
Seaboard Fire Underwriters, 137 Fed. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1905). In discussing the nature
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criteria standards suggested by two federal precedents, In re Poland
Union 15 and Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust.'6 Both cases
found the act's general definitions of "person!' and "corporation" control-
ling: the former opinion maintained that an unincorporated company was
a "group of individuals whose object and purpose are either wholly or
chiefly of the same kind as the object and purpose of a moneyed business
or commercial corporation," 17 and the latter expanded this conceptualism
by adding "and conducting their affairs somewhat after the pattern of
corporations." 18 Poland Union is an example of the type of hybrid asso-
ciation treated by the courts as falling within the act's definition of "cor-
poration" and hence amenable to bankruptcy proceedings: a cooperative
store conducting business under articles of association that provided for
an organization similar to a corporation in that officers, directors and
transferable shares were used. In Pope & Cottle two men about to pur-
chase real estate made their mothers beneficiaries of a revocable spendthrift
trust. The beneficiaries contributed no capital and the only power accorded
them by the trust instrument was that of appointing a replacement at the
death or resignation of any trustee. There the court found the arrangement
to be an ordinary express trust and, though noting that the phrase "unin-
corporated companies and associations" does not admit of easy interpreta-
tion,19 concluded that trusts as such were not allowed the benefits of the
act inasmuch as the beneficiaries had "not associated themselves together
for the conduct of a business with powers similar to those of stockholders
in corporations .... " 20
of a Massachusetts trust before the specific provision concerning these organizations
was added to the act, one court stated: "Undoubtedly, such associations . . .are
held by the Massachusetts courts to be, for certain narrowly limited purposes, partner-
ships. But it does not at all follow that under federal law they cannot be properly
adjudicated bankrupt as unincorporated companies." Gallagher v. Hannigan, 5 F.2d
171, 174 (1st Cir. 1925).
15 77 F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1935).
16124 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1941).
17 77 F.2d at 856. This case involved a petition for reorganization under § 77B
of the act. Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat 912. In terms of New York
law the Poland Union was held to be a joint-stock company and, for purposes of
the act, an unincorporated company.
Is 124 F.2d at 134. There, an involuntary petition and a petition for reorgani-
zation under Chapter X of the Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 885 (1938), as amended, 11
U.S.C. § 526 (1958), were involved and the general definitions were considered at
length.
19 "The phrase [any unincorporated company] has been a puzzling one for the
courts. . . . [The] courts have not attempted to give any comprehensive definition
of 'unincorporated company' but have been inclined to decide each case on its facts
as it arose." 124 F.2d at 134 (Magruder, J.). Compare MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY
§ 354 (1956): "The assertion in the 1926 Amendment that 'corporation' includes
unincorporated associations is paradoxical and correspondingly impractical in con-
ception. This definition has not actually caused the trouble it might be expected to
cause. Bankrupts may be corporations, partnerships, or individuals. The definitions
in the Bankruptcy Act indicate a preference for administering the associations as
corporations, when it is practical and when there is any valid legal reason for
doing so."
20 124 F.2d at 135.
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Courts have tended not to recognize pecuniary organizations-such
as those involved in Poland Union and In re Sargent Lumber Co.2 1-as
"unincorporated companies or associations" unless there has been con-
tribution to capital by shareholders or beneficiaries. In the instant case
the beneficiaries were not obligated to contribute funds to the trust-this
was done by the settlor company. Nor did the beneficiaries purposefully
associate themselves in an employees' trust as did the Poland Union share-
holders in an operating business. 22  And finally, the trustees of the em-
ployees' trust were given powers over the trust property as if they, as
individuals, owned it; such was not the case in the imitative corporate form
contemplated by the articles of association in Poland Union. From an
economic standpoint an employees' profit sharing trust is somewhat different
from the ordinary trust established to benefit infants or the aged.23 There
are more beneficiaries than in the ordinary situation; beneficiaries may
change as employees join or leave the settlor company; and the motives
for establishment may also differ-an employees' trust may be created to'
provide fringe benefits rather than because the employees are the natural
objects of the settlor's bounty. But these distinctions fail to support a
differentiation in bankruptcy treatment between the ordinary trust-as
found in Pope & Cottle-and the situation described in the instant case.
The court in the instant case failed to speak directly to whether the
trust was a "body" endowed with "any of the powers and privileges of
private corporations not possessed by individuals and partnerships" 24
characteristics of a "corporation" as defined by the statute. This phrase
contains two requisites: a body, and corporate powers and privileges con-
ferred thereupon. Institutionally, the trust designates a relationship among
individuals as individuals, 25 and neither this relationship nor the trust
corpus amounts to a legal entity.26 And even if an entity were found, it
21287 Fed. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1923). There, an organization of shareholders who
contributed to a capital fund and elected trustees who were granted "'all the powers
incident to such officers in the case of a corporation'" was adjudicated a voluntary
bankrupt.
22 Cf. In re Bloom, 10 F. Supp. 806 (N.D. Ill. 1935) (father conveyed real estate
subject to mortgage to trustee for the use of son, trustee held to be a person and not
a corporation for purposes of composition under § 74).
23 See generally Note, Protection of Beneficiaries Under Employee Benefit Plans,
58 CoLum. L. REv. 78 (1958).
24 See note 8 supra. In a leading case, In re Carthage Lodge, 230 Fed. 694
(N.D.N.Y. 1916), a fraternal organization chartered under the laws of New York
was held to possess the attributes of a corporation in that the "trustees" could hold
and sue for the recovery of land in their names at the direction of the members, issue
bonds to finance the purchase of land, and manage the affairs of the lodge. A more
recent case, It re Philadelphia Consistory, 40 F. Supp. 645 (E.D. Pa. 1941), held
another lodge amenable after the opinion reiterated the allegations of the petitioner
that it had a common name, a constitution and by-laws, elected governing trustees,
could own property, could sue and be sued, and acted by its trustees.
25 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 2 (1959). But cf. Greenough v. Tax
Assessor, 331 U.S. 486, 493-94 (1947).
2 6 BOGERT, TauSTS & TRUsTEES § 712, at 450 (2d ed. 1960).
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must meet the second statutory requirement of corporate powers and
privileges. To ascertain this, the court might have compared the powers
purportedly granted by the trust agreement against those inherent in in-
dividuals; in other words, did the trust possess any corporate incidents
which it, or its trustees as individuals in a fiduciary capacity, could not
otherwise attain? The opinion did note that the trustees could, among other
broad powers, invest trust funds in securities as well as vote and encumber
them. Petitioners relied heavily upon this ability to invest; 27 and to prove
that the trust was a "body" they emphasized the agreement's stipulation
that the trust would be a "legal entity" 28 and also that the trustees would
not be liable to third parties except for gross negligence.29  It is difficult,
however, to envision the creation of such privileges and immunities with-
out compliance with some authorizing statute.30 Neither the investment of
trust funds in securities nor the subsequent use of those securities as col-
lateral for a loan lies beyond the powers of trustees as individuals when, as
in the instant case, the powers are expressly provided for by the settlor.31
Therefore, in the context of the act, this power is not one not possessed by
individuals. And while the Rule Against Perpetuities does not, by local
statute,32 apply to an employees' trust fund, it cannot be said that the
corporate attribute of indefinite existence will create an entity where one
does not already exist.
33
Disallowance of adjudicating the trust as an entity does not disserve
the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act by allowing favoritism toward par-
ticular creditors or denying relief to the honest debtor who wishes to return
to the business world discharged from debt.34 Indeed, there is no business
27 See Brief for Appellant, p. 17.
28 Id. at 16.
29 Id. at 19.
30 Cf. Pope & Cottle Co. v. Fairbanks Realty Trust, 124 F2d 132, 135 (1st Cir.
1941) : "It is hardly necessary to point out that the Fairbanks Realty Trust is not
a body 'having any of the powers and privileges of private corporations not possessed
by individuals or partnerships. It is not organized under any law giving special
privileges."
31 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 26, § 711.
3 2 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 456.060 (1956).
3The court in the instant case concluded that the trust was not a "person,"
,vithout extended discussion of that word. Courts usually do not focus on this par-
ticular term-perhaps because of its imprecision or because judges believe it is merely
a shorthand method of referring to the definition of "corporation"-but rather decide
doubtful cases on the definition of "corporation"; it has, however, been specifically
held that for purposes of the act the trustee of an express trust is a "person" as
contemplated by the act, and not a "corporation." In re Bloom, 10 F. Supp. 806
(N.D. Ill. 1935). Of the four classes of "persons," two (officers and women) are
human beings, another (corporation) is usually considered a juristic person, and the
fourth (partnerships) is an entity or juristic person by force of the statute itself.
1 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY § 5.03 (14th ed. 1956). Therefore, inasmuch as neither
common law nor another section of the act considers the trust relationship as forming
a juristic person or legal entity, it would seem excluded under the definition of
"person" in the light of'the illustrations provided in § 1(8). See note 8 supra.
34 See 1 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 17 (5th ed. 1950).
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to which the profit sharing trust may reasonably be expected to return; a5
and, assuming that the trustee or trustees can be subjected to bankruptcy
proceedings as a "person," 36 the possibility remains that creditors may yet
obtain payment out of the trust corpus. Trust law gives to the trustee a
right of reimbursement from the fund where he has personally satisfied a
liability on an intra vires contract,3 7 and he may properly use trust funds
to exonerate this liability.38 As for pursuing this right into bankruptcy
proceedings, the act provides that the trustee in bankruptcy is vested with
the bankrupt's title in certain property including rights of action.39 It is
35 Cf. MAcLACuLAN, BANKRUPTCY § 354 (1956).
36 The problem of liquidating a trust without the machinery of the act is not
dealt with at length by the text writers and there is a paucity of cases on the point,
perhaps because trustees are held to high standards of investment and administration
with the result that trust insolvency is an infrequent occurrence. The § 4 prohibition
on bankruptcy proceedings for banking corporations also contributes to the lack of
cases under the act, inasmuch as banks and trust companies probably have title to
a large number of trust funds. Regarding liquidation of trusts, Glenn states without
citation of authority that "the trust of the sort that was known to our grandfathers
does not require liquidation by the use of bankruptcy or general assignment. This
method of ownership being a creation of the equitable process solely, not only is its
liquidation for a court of equity, but the jurisdiction is ample for that purpose."
GLENN, LIQuiDATioN § 72 (1935). "[L]iquidation of a trust estate, in whatever form
we may find it, is essentially the business of courts of equity." Id. at § 148. The same
section also states that the appointment of a receiver in equity is not necessary.
However, bankruptcy jurisdiction in a state court rather than in the district court
would pose problems concerning, e.g., the power of a receiver, if one were appointed,
to sue in foreign jurisdictions, O'Connell v. Smith, 131 S.W.2d 730 (Mo. Ct. App.
1939) ; provision for ratable apportionment among creditors to avoid "the race to the
courthouse door," ibid.; the effectiveness of a discharge against nonresident creditors,
5 REmINGTON, BANKRUPTCY § 2112 (5th ed. 1950) ; the status of a receiver in relation
to the trust property, Union Natil Bank v. Kansas City Bank, 136 U.S. 223, 236
(1890). Courts of equity will, in some jurisdictions, allow a creditor to be subrogated
to the trustee's right to indemnification where the trustee is insolvent. For an ex-
tended discussion of whether and by what legal theories a creditor can reach trust
funds, see BOGERT, op. cit. sitpra note 26, § 716; 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS §§ 266-71A (2d ed.
1956). Several situations can be envisioned where the position of the creditors,
trustee and trust estate would vary depending on the state of the accounts between
trustee and corpus, the financial state of both the trustee and the estate, and on whether
subrogation is allowed. For instance, where the trustee is solvent, an action at law
by each creditor would suffice; however, where the corpus is insolvent, the trustee
would probably not be able to recover the deficiency from the beneficiary, BOGERT,
op. cit. supra note 26, § 718. And where the trustee is insolvent and the corpus solvent,
equity may allow the creditors' claims to be subrogated. If subrogation is not allowed
it is doubtful that the creditors could sustain a suit against the beneficiary. Ibid.
37 BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 26, §§ 716, 718; 3 ScoT, TRUSTS § 244 (2d ed. 1956).
s BOGERT, op. cit. supra note 26, § 718; 3 SCOTT, TRUSTS §§ 244, 246 (2d ed.
1956); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRUSTS §§ 244, 246 (1959).
39 "The trustee of the estate of the bankrupt . . . shall in turn be vested by
operation of law with the title of the bankrupt . . . to all of the following kinds
of property wherever located . . . (5) property, including rights of action, which
prior to the filing of the petition he could by any means have transferred or which
might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process against him, or other-
wise seized, impounded, or sequestered . . . (6) rights of action arising upon con-
tracts . . . . " 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1958). (Em-
phasis added.) One court has characterized the phrase "rights of action" as a "formal
demand made by another in the assertion of a legal or equitable right and instituted
upon in a proper tribunal." Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d 725, 729 (3d Cir. 1925).
A rule has been stated that title to property impressed with a trust does not vest in
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likely that by this means the trustee in bankruptcy would be subrogated to
whatever indemnification rights the bankrupt might possess 40 and that
he would be vested with title thereto.41
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FEDERAL CommuaICATIONs ACT
SECTIOx 605 HELD NOT To PE-EMPT STATE STATUTES PU ISHING
WnMTAPPING
Defendant, in association with a private investigator and several tele-
phone company employees, maintained wiretapping plants which supplied
defendant's "clients" with information concerning their competitors or
the bankrupt's trustee where the beneficiary can trace the trust assets. 4 Cou.mR,
BANKRUPTCY § 70.25 (14th ed. 1956); GLENN, LIQuWATIoN § 72 (1935); 3 RaInNG-
TON, BANKRUPTCY § 1212 (5th ed. 1950). The Restatement states the rule that "under
the National Bankruptcy Act if a trustee becomes bankrupt his trustee in bankruptcy
is not a bona fide purchaser of the trust property." 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
TRUSTS § 307 (1959). It should be noted that this rule speaks to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy not being vested with title to the trust res. Contrast this with the assumption
that title to a claim against the res will pass to the trustee. Furthermore, the Re-
statement rule is based on cases involving constructive trusts and those where con-
tracts were made without direct benefit to the trust estate. No case closely resembling
the instant fact situation has been found. For an example of the constructive trust
cases, see In re States Motors, Inc., 168 F. Supp. 82 (E.D. Mich. 1958) (bankrupt
employer's certified check for withholding tax held trust fund under federal statute
and therefore unavailable to creditors). A type of transaction which is perhaps closer
to the situation under discussion is It re Steele-Smith Dry Goods Co., 298 Fed. 812
(N.D. Ala. 1924), where a department store which later became bankrupt leased
space and retained lessee's receipts for periodic distribution. It was held that lessee
could trace funds despite the fact that bankrupt supplied heat, light, etc., and utility
companies may have been among the creditors. In view of the cases on which it
relies, the Restatement rule may be too broadly stated.
40 But cf. In re Furness, 7 F. Supp. 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1934). Here, the bankrupt
was trustee of a testamentary trust and had not received compensation for his services
prior to bankruptcy. The court held that, inasmuch as under New York decisions
his right to compensation was "inchoate" until a proper accounting was made, "no
title vested in this trustee [in bankruptcy] to such future allowance under the pro-
vision of [§ 70(a) (5)] however broadly this may be interpreted." The policy behind
this inchoate rule is based on the belief that if the right to compensation were com-
plete and assignable before the settling of accounts, "a strong incentive to diligence
and zeal is wanting, and the temptation to be content with lax or perfunctory adminis-
tration of the trust becomes more pursuasive." In re Worthington, 141 N.Y. 9, 35
N.E. 929 (1894). The policy behind compensation which determined Furness would
seem to be lacking in the context of the assignability of the right to reimbursement.
4 1 Cases regarding other property rights and claims which have been deemed to
pass to the trustee in bankruptcy under § 70(a) (5) are: Chandler v. Nathans, 6 F.2d
725 (3d Cir. 1925) (claim on the federal government for a tax refund) ; In re Fisher,
103 Fed. 860 (1st Cir. 1900) (license to sell liquor); In re Ghazal, 169 Fed. 147
(E.D.N.Y. 1909) (claim to reward); In re St. John, 105 Fed. 234 (N.D.N.Y. 1900)
(interest in a vested remainder). A suggestion that the courts might be willing to
recognize that the trustee in bankruptcy may claim the indemnity rights was made in
In re Tate-Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (E.D. Pa. 1949): "A bankruptcy trustee
takes title to all property in which the bankrupt has title, although it be held in trust,
but when it appears that a bankrupt is only a trustee and has no beneficial interest
in or claim against the property, the court should turn it over to its own true owner
where possible." Id. at 981. (Emphasis added.)
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spouses.1 Defendant was convicted under the New York wiretapping law
which punishes not only tapping itself but also the use and possession of
wiretap instruments.2  The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction, holding that the state statute was not superceded by the Federal
Communications Act provision prohibiting interception and divulgence
of telephonic communications. 3 People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 500, 158 N.E.
2d 817, 186 N.Y.S.2d 230, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 361 U.S. 8
(1959).
Though concurrent regulation by federal and state governments is
constitutionally permissible,4 a state statute will be declared inoperative
whenever Congress intends that its enactment should "occupy the field." r,
Rarely, however, will the federal statute include an express statement of
federal exclusiveness. 6 If the state statute contradicts either the terms or
the objectives of the federal program, the former must yield; 7 and judicial
application of such tests as "pervasiveness of the federal statute," "dominant
federal interest" and "conflict in administration" has resulted in the im-
plication to Congress of pre-emptive intent and consequent supercession of
the state statute even where the local enactment is designed to complement
federal legislation.8 The federal statute involved in the instant case, the
Federal Communications Act, provides a comprehensive scheme of national
communications regulation and section 605 9 prohibits the interception and
divulgence of telephonic communications. Construction of this section
1 For a detailed narrative of the intriguing factual situation see DASH, KNOWLTON
& SCHWARTZ, THE EAVESDROPPERS 80-94 (1959).
2 Conviction was based on N.Y. Laws 1901, ch. 661, § 1 and N.Y. Laws 1911,
ch. 316, § 1(6), which were consolidated in 1957 with other provisions into a new
heading called "Eavesdropping." See N.Y. PEN. LAws §§ 738-45.
3 Federal Communications Act § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
4Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236, 240 (1871). See also Grant, The
Scope and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 CoLum. L. REv. 995 (1934).
5 This power of Congress derives from the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
U.S. CONST. art. VI. See Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237
U.S. 597 (1915) ; Ex parte McNeil, supra note 4, at 240; cf. California v. Zook, 336
U.S. 725 (1949). See also Note, 60 HARv. L. Rnv. 262 (1946); Note, 86 U. PA. L.
REv. 532 (1938).
6 No federal statute has yet expressly excluded the states from legislating' in an
area, but some have provided that state statutes may remain intact. E.g., 18 U.S.C.
83231 (1958); 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (2) (Supp. 1959).
7 Sinnot v. Davenport, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 227, 243 (1859).
8 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) ; Southern Ry. v. Rail-
road Conm'n, 236 U.S. 439 (1915); Erie R.R. v. New York, 233 U.S. 671 (1914).
See also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947) (pervasiveness);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1940) (dominant federal interest) ; Pennsylvania
R.RL v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919) (pervasiveness); New York
Cent. R.. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917) (desirability of uniform treatment);
Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915) (desirability
of uniform treatment). But see Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362
U.S. 440 (1960); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949); New York Cent. R.R. v.
Winfield, supra at 154 (dissent of Brandeis, J.).
9 48 Stat. 1163 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958).
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has occurred most often in cases involving the admissibility of wiretap
evidence,' and no case has held it to pre-empt state penal statutes con-
demning similar activity." Neither the terms nor the objectives of the
New York statute conflict with those of section 605-enforcement of both
statutes will result in protection against unwarranted intrusions on privacy
and against damage to the communications system. In fact, the state statute
is even more comprehensive than its federal counterpart.1
2
To ascertain whether the supplemental New York legislation was
superceded by section 605, the court applied the three tests enunciated in
Pennsylvania v. Nelson,13 where the Supreme Court held a state statute
punishing subversive activities against the United States to be pre-empted
by federal prohibitions. First, was the scheme of section 605 so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress had left no room for
state supplementation? 1 The court found it necessary to distinguish
Benanti v. United States,15 which stated with regard to the validity of an-
other New York statute authorizing wiretaps upon ex parte orders that
"keeping in mind this comprehensive scheme of interstate regulation and the
public policy underlying section 605 as part of that scheme, we find that
Congress, setting out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow
state legislation which would contradict that section and that policy." 16
Emphasizing that the Benanti holding was based on contradiction and did
not go directly to the issue of pervasiveness, the court went on to view
section 605 as an entity in itself and concluded that it appeared to lack the
broad sweep of the federal statutes held pre-emptive in Nelson.'7 Whatever
10 Admission of wiretap evidence in a criminal proceeding does not violate the
constitutional guarantees of the fourth or fifth amendments. Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). But since the enactment of the Federal Communications
Act in 1934, the Supreme Court has refused to allow the admission in federal courts
of any evidence obtained by violating § 605 of that act. E.g., Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). Although § 605 applies to intrastate as well as inter-
state communications, Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939), a state court's
admission of such illegally obtained evidence does not constitute a violation of due
process. Schwartz v. United States, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). But see Pugach v. Dol-
linger, 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960). But wiretap evidence procured by state officers,
even pursuant to state procedures authorizing wiretaps, is acquired through a violation
of § 605 and is therefore inadmissible in federal courts. Benanti v. United States,
355 U.S. 96 (1957).
11 See Benanti v. United States, supra note 10.
12 See text accompanying note 2 supra. See generally DAsH, KNOWLTON &
SCHwARTZ, THE EAvESDROPPERs 423-39 (1959). Section 605 prohibits only an inter-
ception and divulgence and several courts have required the commission of both acts
before finding a violation. United States v. Sullivan, 116 F. Supp. 480 (D.D.C. 1953),
aft'd, 219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867, 871
(D.D.C. 1950), rev'd, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926 (1952).
But see Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 100 n.5 (1957) (dictum).
13350 U.S. 497 (1956).
14 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
15 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
16 Id. at 105-06.
-7 See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
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the propriety of the court's result, this dissection of the Federal Communica-
tions Act would seem questionable at best, especially in view of the Supreme
Court's reconsideration of the matter in Benanti. While the Court did, in
Weiss v. United States,18 differentiate the thrust of section 605 from the
scheme of the rest of the statute for the purpose of applying its sanctions to
intrastate communications, Benanti more recently recognized that section
605 is an integral part of the act's regulatory program. 19 And by reading
the wiretapping section in context with the entire statute, a not unreasonable
conclusion could be drawn that the federal act is "pervasive"-a term itself
implying little.20
The second test concerns "dominant federal interest" and it is apparent
that a strong national interest is involved in controlling and safeguarding
telephonic communications. Even though it was conceded that the control
of telephonic communications falls within the scope of national interest,
the court circumnavigated this obstacle by reasoning "that protecting the
individual's right of privacy is an area primarily entrusted to the care of
the States rather than the Federal Government, falling logically within the
ambit of the State's police power." 21 This reasoning, however, assumes its
conclusion: that section 605 can be read as continuing the states' respon-
siblity for the protection of privacy. Several federal courts have construed
the section's purpose as protection of the integrity of the communications
system 22 while another has viewed it as a safeguard of privacy.
23 But it
would seem that acceptance of the one interpretation would not necessarily
exclude the other-a possibility overlooked in the instant case. Perhaps
more significant is the realization that, in all cases of concurrent exercise
of legislative powers, the subject acted upon will be within both the scope
of the national interest and the area of legitimate operation of the state's
police power.24 Many state statutes covering matters which appear to lie
within the realm of exclusive federal control have been saved from pre-
emption because they were viewed as malicious mischief laws aimed at
curbing injury and violence to individuals and property.2 5 The run-of-the-
mill state wiretap statute could be sustained in this fashion since it prohibits
18 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
19 355 U.S. at 104-06.
20 See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra.
21 Instant case at 513, 158 N.E.2d at 824, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
22 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942); Diamond v. United
States, 108 F.2d 859, 860 (6th Cir. 1938) ; United States v. Coplon, 91 F. Supp. 867,
871 (D.D.C. 1950), rez'd, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 926
(1952).
23 United States v. Hill, 149 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
24 See note 31 infra.
25 For example, the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140, 141 (1947), 29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1958), has been held to pre-empt general state regulation of picket-
ing but not to such an extent that a state will be precluded from protecting against
violence. See UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 351 U.S. 266 (1956).
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wiretapping only to the extent that damage to property results.26  But New
York can not benefit from this argument because its statute has been inter-
preted as designed primarily to protect the privacy of telephonic com-
munications.
27
Application of the third test--"conflict of administration"-may be
somewhat more helpful in determining what Congress intended in that it
does involve practical considerations. In the instant case the court reasoned
that the state's legislation protecting its citizens from wiretapping would
not interfere with any federal program 28 inasmuch as, unlike the extensive
federal activity against subversion in the Nelson situation, there was no
appreciable federal program based on section 605 and federal prosecutions
under that section were sparse.29  But even if federal enforcement were
extensive, it would not preclude sustaining the state statute. There are
many areas in which federal and local authorities cooperate even though
each acts in its own right.3" Only where conflict will inevitably arise from
any concurrent enforcement is an inference of congressional pre-emptive
intent justified.
It is doubtful that an accurate determination of what Congress intended
can be made merely by applying standards such as "dominant federal
interest," "pervasiveness" and the like. It is a heavy task to displace a state
enactment by implication or reflection from a federal statute, and it is no
wonder that even the Supreme Court has been uncertain in applying its
"tests." 31 By not expressly stating an intention to exclude state action,
26 For a summary of state wiretap statutes see Note, 67 YALE L.J. 932 (1958).
See also Rosenzweig, The Law of Wire Tapping, 33 CORNEL L.Q. 73 (1947).
27 People v. Applebaum, 277 App. Div. 43, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, aff'd, 301 N.Y. 738,
95 N.E.2d 410 (1950). This interpretation was accepted in the instant case.
2
8 Instant case at 513, 158 N.E.2d at 824-25, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 241.
2 9 There appear to have been only three convictions under § 605 since its enact-
ment in 1934. See Massicot v. United States, 254 F.2d 58 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 816 (1958); United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957); United
States v. Gruber, 39 F. Supp. 291 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 123 F2d 307 (2d Cir. 1941).
30 A conspicuous example of federal-state cooperation is in the area of criminal
investigation and detection, but there are many others. See Andrews, New Mechanics
of Federal-State Cooperation, 7 FED. B.J. 42 (1945); Anslinger, Cooperation in
Narcotic-Law Enforcement, 12 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 88 (1957); Koenig, Federal
and State Cooperation Under the Constitution, 36 MicH. L. REv. 752 (1938). The
regulation of misbranded and adulterated food products is another such field. See
Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427 (1919); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501
(1912). But cf. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942).
31The Court seems to have applied its tests either separately or in concert
without assigning any relative weight to them. For example, a state safety measure
regulating train length was held invalid as unduly burdening interstate commerce,
Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), but a state ban on overly wide
and heavy interstate trucks was sustained on the theory that the regulation of high-
ways is a concern more local in nature than that of railroads. See South Carolina
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); cf. Southern Ry. v. King,
217 U.S. 524 (1910). Though Congress has excluded misbranded and adulterated
articles from interstate commerce, the states may require, as local health measures,
the disclosure of contents, Savage v. Jones, supra note 30, and specific labels, Corn
Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, supra note 30; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S.
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Congress has made necessary judicial decision of social, economic, and
political questions which Congress neglected or avoided. Dissatisfaction
with and distrust of any type of universal test for ascertaining unexpressed
congressional intent has found expression on the present Court; Mr. justice
Frankfurter has stated: "Proper accommodation is dependent on an
empiric process, on case-to-case determinations. Abstract propositions and
unquestioned generalities do not furnish answers." 3 2 And even Nelson,
after analyzing and applying the three tests, moved on to consider other
factors and indicated that the possibility of double prosecution militated
toward a conclusion of pre-emption.3
The court in the instant case apparently considered the Supreme
Court's three tests as the exclusive criteria of pre-emption-that a negative
answer to each would necessarily presage a finding of no pre-emptive intent
on the part of Congress. But these tests, as we have seen, actually add
little to meaningful deliberation and other considerations should and must
be examined to arrive at a sound conclusion. A state court may begin with
a presumption of the validity of the state statute 34 since the effect of a
decision of invalidity merely removes state sanctions without the congres-
sional reappraisal often engendered by a Supreme Court holding3 5 The
likelihood of double prosecution should also be considered; 3 6 it seems that
510 (1916). And while it would appear that a "dominant federal interest" is involved
equally when there is interference with wartime enlistment and when there are sub-
versive activities against the national government, a state is not precluded from acting
in the former instance, Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920), but is pre-empted
in the latter, Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956). Conflict of administration
is another area of uncertainty. Where actual conflict exists the state statute has been
declared invalid, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). But where conflict is
merely possible, the local enactments have been allowed to stand. Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943); H. P. Welch Co. v. New Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79 (1939);
Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Nebraska State Ry. Comm'n, 297 U.S. 471 (1936).
In Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra, the Court felt that the mere possibility of conflict
was sufficient to satisfy the test. But cf. California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949),
where the Court found no clear manifestation of congressional intent to pre-empt and
thus avoided the application of any of its tests.
32UMW v. Arkansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62, 76 (1956) (dissenting
opinion). See also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
33 Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1956).
3 4 See, e.g., Harlem Check Cashing Corp. v. Bell, 296 N.Y. 15, 17-18, 68 N.E.2d
854, 855 (1946) (per curiam). But cf. Pennsylvania v. Nelson, supra note 33, at 504.
35 In response to the Supreme Courts decisions in Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957), and San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236 (1959), Congress included in the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164(c) (1) (Supp. 1959), a provision
designed to eliminate the no-man's land created by those decisions. See 108 U. PA.
L. R v. 587 (1960).
36 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 509-10 (1956) ; California v.
Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 737-38 (1949). See also Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State
and Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparison, 4 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1
(1956); Note, Pre-Emption By Federal Criminal Statutes, 55 CoLum. L. REv. 83
(1955). The penalty for violating § 605 is a fine of not more than $10,000 or im-
prisonment for not more than 1 year, or both, for the first offense. A second or
subsequent offense may include imprisonment for up to 2 years. Federal Communi-
cations Act § 501, 68 Stat. 30 (1954), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1958).
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nothing would stand in the way of a subsequent federal prosecution under
section 605.37 Possible injustice to the defendant must be weighed against
the desirability of saving the state statute if the language of pre-emptive
intent--did Congress intend to define the outermost limits of penalty-is to
be given meaningful content.38 Though troublesome, the same problems
were handled in California v. Zook,39 where a sharply divided Court sus-
tained a state prosecution for the very act which was subject also to federal
sanctions. And in the instant case, the rare enforcement of section 605 40_
which renders the possibility of double prosecution little more than academic
-should militate toward sustaining the more comprehensive state wire-
tap act.
The malicious mischief-type wiretap laws of many states 41 render
prosecution on the state level inconsistent and inadequate: 42 the wire-
tapper's modern techniques will seldom cause damage to the line.4 3 And
even under New York's comprehensive scheme of direct prohibitions there
have been few prosecutions.44  While these factors may point to the
desirability of a more extensive and better enforced federal regulation of
wiretapping,45 they are hardly reasons for finding pre-emption in the
absence of some clear manifestation 46 of congressional intent to "occupy the
field."
37 See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359
U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). See also Grant,
The Lanza Rule Of Successive Prosecutions, 32 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1309 (1932) ; Com-
ment, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 188 (1958); Note, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 521 (1958); 34 Tur..
L. REv. 197 (1959).
38 Cf. Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1943) ; Erie R.R. v. New York, 233
U.S. 671 (1914).
39 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
40 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
41 See note 26 mpra and accompanying text.
42 Compare State v. Behringer, 19 Ariz. 502, 172 Pac. 660 (1918); People v.
Dement, 48 Cal. 2d 600, 311 P.2d 505 (1957); People v. Lawrence, 149 Cal. App. 2d
435, 308 P.2d 821 (1957); People v. Miller, 146 Cal. App. 2d 444, 304 P.2d 208
(1956); Williams v. State, 109 So. 2d 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Robert v.
State, 220 Md. 159, 151 A.2d 737 (1959); State v. Giardina, 27 N.J. 313, 142 A.2d
609 (1958); Morse v. Forbes, 24 N.J. 341, 132 A.2d 1 (1957); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 391 Pa. 607, 140 A.2d 347 (1958).
43 Brown & Peer, The Wiretapping Entanglement: How To Strengthen Law
Enforcement and Preserve Privacy, 44 CORF-LL L.Q. 175, 176 (1959).
44 1Before the instant case there was only one conviction for wiretapping in New
York and that occurred more than thirty years ago. People v. Senes, 242 N.Y. 556,
152 N.E. 524 (1926).
45 See Brown & Peer, supra note 43, at 184-85; Dash, Fact Finding on Eaves-
droppers, Prac. Law., Dec. 1958, p. 58; Gerhart, Let's Take the Hypocrisy Out of
Wiretapping, 30 N.Y.S.B. BuLL. 268 (1958); Westin, The Wire-Tapping Problem:
An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 CoLum. L. REv. 165, 200-08 (1952);
Williams, Wiretapping Should Be Liberalized, 30 N.Y.S.B. BuLu. 261 (1958); 13
VAND. L. REv. 547, 550 n.26 (1960); 67 YALE L.J. 932 (1958).
46 See California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949); Maurer v. Hamilton, 309
U.S. 598, 607 (1940).
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CORPORATIONS-ON-E O MA BENEFICIARIES OF AN ACTIVE
TRUST Is NOT A SHAREHOLDER OF THE CORPoRATION WHOSE
STOCK IS HELD BY THE TRUST FOR PURPOSES OF A STooXEOIERS'
DERIVATIVE SUIT
A California remainderman beneficiary of two Connecticut testa-
mentary trusts,1 the res of which consisted in part of shares of corporate
stock,2 brought two actions under diversity jurisdiction 3 in the district
court of Connecticut. The first action was a class suit on behalf of all the
beneficiaries of the trusts against present and former trustees seeking,
inter alia, removal of the present trustees, an accounting by trustees and
others, appointment of a temporary receiver and new trustees, and restora-
tion to the res of property wrongfully transferred therefrom.4 The second,
a stockholders' derivative suit against certain defendants including the
trustees who were also directors of the corporation whose stock was held
by the trust and who, in addition, held stock individually, alleged a con-
spiracy to defraud the corporation 5 and sought a money judgment of
$7,500,000. On consolidated appeals from the district court's orders deny-
ing defendants' motions to dismiss, the Second Circuit reversed and dis-
missed both actions, holding: (1) that under the doctrine of "virtual
representation" the class of trust beneficiaries was so small and so readily
available for actual joinder that the representative action could not be
brought within the numerosity and impracticability provisions of Rule
23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) that, inasmuch as
plaintiff individually did not qualify as a "shareholder" within the meaning
of Rule 23(b) 8 because he did not hold equitable or legal title to any specific
shares of stock held by the trust but merely had-in conjunction with the
other beneficiaries-an equitable interest in such shares, he could not main-
1 The interest was vested as to the George E. Matthies trust, subject to open,
and possibly subject to complete divestment; and was contingent as to the Annie W.
Matthies trust. Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 23 F.R.D. 64, 72-74 (D. Conn. 1958).
For the principal dispositive provisions of the two wills, see id. at 96-98.
2 Both trusts held substantial blocks of stock of the defendant Connecticut cor-
poration, which itself owned all the stock of Batiscan Corporation, a subsidiary
Delaware corporation dissolved in 1957. The district court's dismissal as to the
Seymour Corporation of Delaware (a third corporate defendant that was dissolved
in 1950) under the three-year statute of limitations provided in Dr. CoDE ANN.
tit. 8, § 278 (1953), was not contested on appeal.
3 In the trust action all defendants were Connecticut residents except one, who
was a New York resident. In the stockholders' action all the defendants were
residents of Connecticut, New York, or Delaware. Of the George E. Matthies trust
beneficiaries, only the plaintiff and his daughter lived elsewhere than Connecticut.
Under the Annie W. Matthies trust, in addition to plaintiff and his daughter, some of
the next of kin of Annie who had contingent remaind6rs were not Connecticut
residents.
4 Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co.; 23 F.R.D. 64, 69 (D. Conn. 1958).
5 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 5-6.
6Fan. R. Cirv. P. 23(b) in the relevant part provides: "In an action brought to
enforce a secondary right on the part of . . . shareholders in an association . . .
because the association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by
it, the complaint . . . shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder at the time
of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on
him by operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer on
a court of the United States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise
have jurisdiction. ... "
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tain the stockholders' derivative suit without joining the other beneficiaries;
and (3) that "the [therefore necessary] joinder of any other beneficiary
as a party plaintiff . . . [would] destroy the requisite diversity of citizen-
ship." 7 Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 962 (1960).8
The Second Circuit viewed decision on the plaintiff's right to represent
the trust in a class action 9 as determinative also of the stockholders' deriva-
tive action and failed to analyze the latter as a separate issue. The court
seemed to believe that the derivative action was analogous to a trust bene-
ficiary's suit against a third party for a wrong to the trust, and, since all
the beneficiaries must be in court in that instance, they should also be joined
for the derivative suit. Clearly this is an erroneous line of analysis for
the stockholders' action, which is a suit to restore or protect corporate assets
and where the trust is merely an incidental beneficiary to the extent that its
res consists of stock in the corporation which will be directly benefited if
the action is successful.
In order that a plaintiff may maintain a shareholders' derivative action,
he must be a stockholder when the suit is instituted.' What qualifications
constitute a "stockholder" for purposes of bringing the suit is an issue
frequently considered by federal and state courts, including those state
courts which are bound by statutory requirements similar to Rule 23 (b). 11
It is clear that the holder of legal title to a share of stock which is registered
in his name on the corporate books can maintain a derivative action 12
7 Matthies v. Seymour Mfg. Co., 270 F.2d 365, 368 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 962 (1960); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See
note 3 supra. An interesting recent development in the concept of diversity as applied
to corporations is Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 94-98 (1957), which relaxed the
degree of corporate antagonism to the plaintiff stockholder formerly necessary before
the corporation could be aligned as a party defendant, Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S.
579 (1905). Thus, the federal courts were made more accessible to plaintiffs in
shareholders' derivative actions under diversity jurisdiction. The holding of Matthies
v. Seymour Mfg. Co., supra, that the plaintiff must join the other beneficiaries, may
make the proceedings, whether brought in a federal or a state court, unnecessarily
cumbrous. And where the diversity requisite for federal jurisdiction is destroyed, a
situation where the beneficiaries are residents of many diverse states would present
obvious state procedural difficulties-primarily service on out-of-state residents-that
might prevent plaintiff from pursuing his remedy in any forum.
s Petition for rehearing and reconsideration en banc was denied in an unreported
three-to-two decision, with Chief Judge Clark and Judge Waterman dissenting. Peti-
tion for Certiorari, app. C, p. 89a.
9 For a thorough discussion of this aspect of the case see 69 YALE L.J. 816 (1960).
10 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 350 (rev. ed. 1946); 13 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CoR-
PORATIONS § 5972 (perm. ed. repl. vol. 1943); 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ir 23.17
(2d ed. 1948).
11 See, e.g., ARIZ. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ; CoLo. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ; DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, §327 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 22-711(6) (1948); Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.605
(1959); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-16 (Supp. 1959); N.M. STAT. ANN. §21-1-1(23b)
(1953); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAWS § 61; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1321 (1953). But
see, e.g., CAL. CORP CODE §834(a) (1) and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.405(1) (a) (1957),
which require that a plaintiff in a stockholders' derivative action must have been a
shareholder registered as such at the time of the challenged transaction.
12 Rinn v. Asbestos Mfg. Co., 101 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Rosenthal v. Burry
Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 60 A.2d 106 (1948); News-Journal Corp. v. Gore,
147 Fla. 217, 2 So. 2d 741 (1941) ; Bacon v. National Bank of Commerce, 259 S.W.
244 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
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if he meets the prerequisite of ownership contemporaneous with the alleged
wrongful transaction.' 3 And most recent cases also allow an equitable
owner of stock to prosecute a derivative suit.' 4 While equitable ownership
takes many different forms-for instance, a purchaser of stock in street
name,' 5 a pledgee of stock as collateral,
16 a residuary legatee under a will,'
7
or a beneficiary of a trust that consists of shares of stock '
5 -owners of all
types have been allowed to maintain a secondary action for the benefit of
the corporation. Conceding that the plaintiff in the instant case, unlike a
purchaser in street name, did not have equitable title in any specific shares
of stock but rather had an equitable interest in shares in which other persons
also had an interest, does this difference between title and interest prevent
plaintiff from maintaining a 23(b) action? The Second Circuit answered
in the affirmative.
'3 See Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882). The requirement that a share-
holder be such at the time of the challenged transaction has a dual purpose. One
function, which is common to both federal and state courts, is to preclude commerce
in law suits. Dimpfell v. Ohio & Miss. Ry., 110 U.S. 209, 210 (1884); Rosenthal v.
Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299, 310-11, 60 A.2d 106, 111 (1948). The other
purpose is to prevent the creation of federal jurisdiction by placing shares in the
hands of a nonresident and then having him commence the action. Hawes v. Oakland,
supra at 452-53; Hand v. Kansas City S. Ry., 55 F.2d 712, 714 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
A possible third rationale is the equitable principle that one who was not a share-
holder at the time of the alleged wrongful transaction should not be heard to question
such transactions. Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 657-58, 93 N.W. 1024,
1029 (1903); see 3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10, 23.15. But some state courts
do not require contemporaneous ownership and allow a subsequent transferee of
shares of stock to maintain a derivative action. See, e.g., Parsons v. Joseph, 92 Ala.
403, 8 So. 788 (1890) ; Winsor v. Bailey, 55 N.H. 218 (1875) ; Robertson v. Draney,
53 Utah 263, 271-73, 178 Pac. 35, 38-39 (1918).
14 See cases cited notes 15-18 infra. Some older authority is to the contrary.
See Whitaker v. Whitaker Iron Co., 238 Fed. 980 (N.D.W. Va. 1916), aff'd, 249
Fed. 531 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 248 U.S. 564 (1918); McHenry v. New York,
P. & O.R.R., 22 Fed. 130 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1884); Hedge v. United States Steel
Corp., 64 N.J. Eq. 90, 53 AtI. 601 (Ch. 1902), rev'd on other grounds, 64 N.J. Eq.
807, 54 AtI. 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1903).
15 E.g., Murdock v. Follansbee Steel Corp., 213 F.2d 570 (3d Cir. 1954) ; HFG
Co. v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir. 1947); Steinberg v. Hardy,
90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 299,
60 A.2d 106 (1948).
1
6 E.g., Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Burnham, 67 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
292 U.S. 630 (1933) ; Gorman-Wright Co. v. Wright, 134 Fed. 363 (4th Cir. 1904) ;
Green v. Hedenberg, 159 Ill. 489, 42 N.E. 851 (1896) ; Campbell v. American Zylonite
Co., 122 N.Y. 455, 25 N.E. 853 (1890).
17 Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 145 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
324 U.S. 844 (1945). See also Law v. Alexander Smith & Sons Co., 271 App. Div.
705, 68 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1947), reversing 189 Misc. 200, 66 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct.
1946) (widow elected her statutory share).
' 8 E.g., Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959); Felsenheld v. Bloch
Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545 (1937); Hall v. M. B. O'Reilly
Realty & Inv. Co., 306 Mo. 182, 267 S.W. 407 (1924); Great W. Ry. v. Rushout,
5 Deg. & Sm. 290, 64 Eng. Rep. 1121 (Ch. 1852). Contra, Pflug v. Dietz, 260 App.
Div. 503, 22 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1940), 54 HAv. L. Rav. 1063 (1941). See Willcox v.
Harriman Sec. Corp., 10 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), where, after plaintiffs had
been induced by fraud to transfer legal title in shares of stock to another, the court
impressed a constructive trust on shares in the hands of the fraudulent transferee
and ordered a transfer back to the original owner who was deemed to have held
equitable title throughout the transactions.
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It is not clear whether the requirements of Rule 23 (b) are procedural
or substantive. 19 If they are substantive, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins 20 is ap-
plicable and the law of the state where the court is sitting is determina-
tive; 21 if procedural, then 23(b)-and the federal courts' construction of
it-is controlling. Recognizing this unsettled problem, the court in the
instant case surveyed both state and federal decisions and held that, whether
federal or state law governs, plaintiff cannot maintain the derivative action.
But in Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co.0 2 2 the Fifth Circuit allowed one
of six legatees under a will disposing of corporate stocks to complain of a
wrong to the corporation when the executor had declined to do so-not-
withstanding that the estate had not been settled and that the executor
retained power to sell the stocks for payment of debts of the estate. The
court stated:
"Since equity regards substance rather than form, the equitable title,
in the absence of intervening rights of third parties, is superior to the
naked legal title. In equity, therefore, the owner of the equitable title
to shares of stock is a stockholder in a fuller sense than is the owner
of the naked legal title. Assuredly it is not the purpose of . . .
[Rule 23 (b)] to afford the holder of the naked legal title to shares of
stock a right of action and to deny the holder of a higher right, the
equitable title, such a privilege. The protection of the law would
hardly be denied to the owner of the substance, meanwhile being ac-
corded to the holder of the shadow. We do not believe that it was
the purpose of . . . [Rule 23(b)] to deny the process of the Court
to the owner of an equitable right, title, or interest in stock, regardless
of whether that right be vested or contingent. . . . We conclude,
therefore, that an owner of the equitable title, or an equitable interest
in the title, to shares of stock is not prevented . . . from maintaining
a suit which seeks to protect stock in which he has such an ownership
or interest from impairment or loss." 23
The same view was impliedly adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Santarelli
v. Katz, 24 where the court reached the merits in a stockholders' derivative
suit brought by one of two sisters who were beneficiaries of an inter vivos
trust consisting of shares of stock. Although the Seventh Circuit's opinion
did not specifically address itself to the question of whether the suit could
be maintained on the basis of the plaintiff's mere equitable interest, implicit
19 See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROcEDURE, SECOND PRELiMhI-
NARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED A2miENDMENTS 29-30 (1945). The Advisory Committee
concluded that the wisest course would be to await a judicial decision in a litigated
case.
20 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 1 "[T]hat law will normally refer to the law of the state of incorporation."
3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 10, 23.17 n.6.
22 145 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 844 (1945).
23 Id. at 295. (Emphasis added.) The court drew the same conclusion regarding
the Georgia rule GA. CODE ANN. §22-711(6) (1948).
24 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959). It should be noted that there is a distinction
between Santarelli and Hurt on the one hand and the insthnt case on the other, in
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in the disposition of the case on the merits is that one trust beneficiary
may bring a derivative suit without joining other beneficiaries.m 2 5 And
state cases are not generally helpful in providing a clear-cut answer26 to
the precise question involved in the instant case-whether one of several
beneficiaries of a trust whose res consists in part of shares of stock should
be able to maintain a shareholders' derivative action.
the immediacy of the plaintiff's interest. Santarelli was a life beneficiary at the time
of the challenged transaction and, when she instituted suit, the trust had terminated
by its own terms and she had an immediate right to her share of the res. Hurt was
one of six residuary legatees at the time of the alleged wrongdoing and actually held
legal title to the stock when he brought suit. Matthies, on the other hand, had a
vested remainder interest in the trust res. But the court did not distinguish the
instant case on these lines, nor have other courts drawn such a distinction in deter-
mining the right to maintain a shareholders' derivative action. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)
requires plaintiff to be "a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he
complains," and as of that time the plaintiffs in all three cases had only equitable
interests in the stock.
25 The district court had specifically addressed itself to the issue of maintenance
of the suit under Rule 23(b) by one of the two beneficiaries. Appendix to Brief for
Plaintiff-Appelant, p. 305, Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959). And
the implied holding of the circuit court is strengthened by virtue of the fact that
concurrently with the federal action, the other sister, an Illinois resident, was main-
taining a substantially similar suit on the same facts in the state courts of Illinois.
In the latter proceedings, brought under ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.86 (a) (3)
(Smith-Hurd 1954), the remedies sought by the plaintiff (whose equitable interest
had ripened into legal title after the occurrence of the wrongs on which both actions
were based) were an accounting and dissolution of the corporation. See Letter from
Russell J. Topper, Attorney for Plaintiff, to University of Pennsylvania Law Review,
June 16, 1960, on file in Biddle Law Library, University of Pennsylvania. Inasmuch
as the ultimate relief sought in both cases was identical in that the corporation would
have recovered the losses suffered by it as a result of the fraudulent actions of the
directors, and different only in the incident of dissolution, any consideration that the
plaintiff had no other adequate remedy against the directors must be eliminated from
the circuit court's reasoning. Thus, allowing the one beneficiary to maintain the
suit without joining the other must be premised solely on Rule 23(b).
26 Guidelines which might have been provided by state cases remain ambiguous,
either because one of the crucial issues-necessary joinder-is seldom reached or
because of conflicts within the jurisdiction. A recent lower court decision in Dela-
ware, the state of incorporation of two of the defendant corporations, allowed bene-
ficiaries to maintain a secondary action for the benefit of the corporation. Brown v.
Dolese, 154 A.2d 233 (Del. Ch. 1959). In that case, however, all beneficiaries of the
trust joined as plaintiffs, thereby obviating a determination of whether a single
beneficiary would have been qualified to maintain the suit. Id. at 235. Though not
speaking to a necessary joinder problem, a recent decision in Connecticut, Brecker v.
Nielsen, 21 Conn. Supp. 33, 143 A.2d 463 (Super. Ct. 1958), relevant here inasmuch
as the Seymour Manufacturing Company was incorporated in that state, reflected
the protective concern of courts of equity for trust beneficiaries, even though a writ
of mandamus to require inspection of the corporate books was denied. There, no
allegations of waste, extravagance or mismanagement were made against the officers
and directors of the corporation involved; the court does indicate in dictum, however,
that had there been an allegation of fraudulent conspiracy (as there was in Matthies)
a court of equity would have sustained the efforts of the trust beneficiaries to obtain
information concerning the affairs of the corporation. Id. at 465. Conflict exists in
New York, which is an important center of commercial litigation, and two incon-
sistent lines of cases have evolved. Compare Baum v. Sporborg, 146 App. Div. 537,
131 N.Y. Supp. 267 (1911) ; Singer v. State Laundry, Inc., 188 Misc. 583, 68 N.Y.S2d
808 (Sup. Ct. 1947); and Braman v. Westaway, 60 N.Y.S.2d 190 (1945), modified,
59 N.Y.S.2d 509 (Sup. Ct. 1946); with Faiello v. Li Castri, 2 App. Div. 2d 749,
153 N.Y.S.2d 247 (1956) (mem.); Steuer v. Hector's Tavern, Inc., 1 App. Div. 2d
1003, 151 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1956) (mem.) ; Pflug v. Dietz, 260 App. Div. 503, 22 N.Y.S.2d
968 (1940) (per curiam); and Miller v. Miller, 256 App. Div. 846, 9 N.Y.S.2d 448
(mem.), aff'd, 280 N.Y. 716, 21 N.E.2d 212 (1939). The first group of cases seems to
support the position of the plaintiff in Matthies while the second argues against it.
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Normally, actions by trust beneficiaries seeking relief for wrongs to
the trust are against the trustee.27 However, in exceptional circumstances
-for instance, where, as in the instant case, the trustees are also directors
of the corporation whose stock was held by the trust-the beneficiaries, if
properly joined or represented, are permitted to bypass their primary
recourse and maintain an action directly against the offending third party.28
But here the plaintiff was not attempting to assert, as the representative
of the trust, the trust's derivative claim in regard to a wrong to the cor-
poration; rather he was suing as a stockholder for the benefit of the corpora-
tion. And that action is a device unique to the corporate area embodying
specific policies of shareholder supervision 29 and incorporating its own
rules to protect other parties in interest. °  Therefore, it appears that the
court's requirement of joinder to protect the other beneficiaries 31 is irrele-
vant to the shareholders' derivative action.
Plaintiff meets head-on the issue of ability to maintain a shareholders'
derivative action by arguing that the determinative standard should be "the
relationship of the individual to the res, not labels of uncertain meaning
such as 'title' or 'interest.' "32 On this basis, plaintiff continues, his re-
mainder interest of more than $1,000,000, comprised largely of stock in the
defendant corporation, should enable him to maintain the 23(b) action.
But this suggested criterion presents problems in drawing lines that would
perhaps be more difficult than the conceptual title-and-interest test espoused
by the Second Circuit. Apparently even plaintiff would not argue that any
beneficiary of a trust, no matter how small or contingent his interest in the
res, should be permitted to maintain a derivative action. Presumably, a
person with a minute interest would be required to join other beneficiaries
so that their combined interests, if not then constituting equitable title,
would yet bear a "sufficient" relationship to the res. What percentage or
dollar value should be considered sufficient? Were sufficiency to be defined
in terms of a fixed percentage or valuation-a standard similar to the
substantial interest in the corporation now required by security-for-
expenses statutes-legislative action would probably be required. But
27 4 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRUSTEES § 870, at 457-59, 460-61 (1948).
28 1d. at 459-64. See also Brown v. Dolese, 154 A.2d 233, 239 (Del. Ch. 1959)
(dictum).
29 This aspect of shareholder supervision-implemented through the device of the
derivative suit-has become increasingly important in view of the current business
trend toward dilution of corporate ownership and the concomitant increasing inde-
pendence of corporate directors. See Note, 36 B.U.L. REv. 78 (1956); Note, 99
U. PA. L. REv. 999 (1951).
30 Such as FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c), which requires court approval for the settle-
ment or voluntary dismissal of shareholders' derivative actions, or the various state
security-for-expenses statutes which require, upon motion by the corporation, that a
plaintiff with less than a specified minimum percentage or dollar value holding of
corporate stock post a bond sufficient to defray expenses for which the corporation
might be liable. See CAL. CORP. COnE § 834(b) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14:3-15 (Supp.
1959); N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAws § 61-b; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1322 (1953); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 182.013(3) (1957). Note that Connecticut has no such security-for-
expenses statute.
31 See text accompanying note 9 supra.
32 Petition for Certiorari, p. 21.
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absent such action, a logical criterion to govern actions against corporations
by the owners of equitable interests in its shares could be judicially de-
veloped by analogy to holdings which permit the legal owner of a single
share to maintain a shareholders' derivative suit.33 While some courts
consider the smallness of plaintiff's stockholdings as a circumstance relevant
to the equities and good faith of the action,34 the right of action nevertheless
remains. Therefore, it is suggested that a workable criterion determining
who qualifies as a "shareholder"-one which would recognize the vital
nature of this remedial device yet not involve the courts in an essentially
legislative decision-would be a standard that allows one who has an equi-
table interest in stock equivalent to the present fair market value or book
value of at least one share of stock 35 to maintain a shareholders' derivative
action. Such a test would provide a standard which is both objective and
at the same time more equitable than the title-interest line of analysis em-
ployed by the Second Circuit.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-SALs TO WHOLESALERS CONDI-
TIO1ED oN T E .r RrFUsAL To SELL TO PRICE-CUTTING RETAILERS
Wao ARE INFORMED OF SUCH PoLICY CONSTITUTES A COMBINATION
AND C OSsPIRACY
The United States sought to restrain violations of sections 1 and 3
of the Sherman Antitrust Act,1 alleging that defendant drug manufacturer
had combined and conspired with certain distributors to maintain retail
prices on its products. Defendant sold a variety of pharmaceutical prod-
ucts nationally through wholesalers and directly to some retailers and had
a schedule of suggested minimum resale prices for each type of customer.
33 See, e.g., General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry., 250 Fed. 160 (6th
Cir. 1918), aft'd, 269 Fed. 235 (6th Cir. 1920), modified, aff'd, 260 U.S. 261 (1922)
(5 shares out of 499,961 shares outstanding); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Hydraulic
Brake Co., 269 Mich. 560, 257 N.W. 884 (1934) (50 out of over 53,000 shares);
Levine v. Behn, 169 Misc. 601, 8 N.Y.S.2d 58 (Sup. Ct. 1938), rev'd on other grounds,
282 N.Y. 120, 25 N.E.2d 871 (1940) (one plaintiff owned one share of stock and the
other owned 24 of 6,200,000 shares outstanding). See generally FLETCHER, op. cit.
mupra note 10, § 5885.
34 See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 318-23 (1936); Clarke v. Gold
Dust Corp., 106 F.2d 598, 604 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 671 (1940);
Isaac v. Milton Mfg. Co., 33 F. Supp. 732, 737 (M.D. Pa. 1940); Aldrich v. Union
Bag & Paper Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 244, 245, 87 Atl. 65 (Ch. 1913).
35 Or who has an interest monetarily equivalent to whatever requirements are
placed on equitable or legal title holders in the jurisdiction in question.
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3, 4 (1958). Section 1 provides
that "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. . . . Every person who shall make any contract or engage
in any combination or conspiracy declared . . . to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor. . . ." Section 3 uses similar language but deals with the District
of Columbia. Section 4 provides that "the several district courts of the United States
are invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of . . . this title;
and it shall be the duty of the several United States attorneys . . . to institute
proceedings in equity to prevent and restrain such violations. .. ."
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In an effort to gain compliance with its retail price schedules, the defend-
ant informed wholesalers that it would refuse to sell to them not only if
they cut their own prices but also if they sold to retailers who undercut
suggested prices. The defendant also informed retailers of this expanded
enforcement program, its former policy of dealing with only those customers
who abided by their respective schedules having proved ineffective in
achieving uniform adherence to retail price lists. Retailers who refused
any assurance of compliance were cut off, wholesalers being instructed not
to sell to them. The new method also proved ineffective to stop price
cutting, and a compromise was reached whereby the defendant restored
sales upon a retailer's ceasing to advertise Parke, Davis products at lower-
than-list prices. After the Government completed presentation of this
evidence at the trial, the district court 2 ruled that no showing of any viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act had been made inasmuch as there was
no agreement with co-conspirators-the defendant manufacturer's actions
being merely unilateral. No allegation or finding that defendant was a
violator of the monopoly provisions of the act having been made,3 the court
further reasoned that there was no coerced combination inasmuch as the
retailers were free either to do without the goods or to sell them in accord-
ance with the manufacturer's 'policies. On direct appeal 4 the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that sales to wholesalers conditioned on their
refusal to sell to price-cutting retailers who are informed of the policy and
who subsequently compromise with defendant in order to have discontinued
sales reinstituted fall within the act's proscriptions. Should the defendant
not refute the facts, the Government would be entitled to an injunction.
United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 5
Price-maintenance agreements were first held to be contracts or com-
binations in restraint of trade under section 1 in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co.,6 which established that a seller, having once sold
his product, cannot fix the price for subsequent resale. There the contracts
were written, and the case, therefore, did not involve questions of implied
contracts, coercion or selective selling-problems which remained to be
solved in future litigation. In a context of procedural limitations neces-
sitated by a faulty indictment, United States v. Colgate & Co.7 held that a
2 United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 164 F. Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1958).
3 Sherman Antitrust Act § 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). In a
monopoly context the alleged actions of the defendant would have had different
implications, and the holding of the district court is clearly not one involving a
monopolistic manufacturer. However, a violation of § 1 a fortiori becomes an "attempt
to monopolize" under § 2 in the case of a monopolistic manufacturer.
4 See Expediting Act § 2, 32 Stat 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1958).
5 Mr. justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, which contained an
elaborate history of what constituted a violation of § 1. Mr. Justice Stewart con-
curred in the result, although impliedly finding the majority's elaborate distinctions
not meaningful or necessary, as he considered defendant's action a combination to
maintain retail prices and thus a clear violation. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by
justices Frankfurter and Whittaker, dissented, finding the distinctions untenable and
declining to come to the majority result without overruling precedents.
6220 U.S. 373 (1911).
7250 U.S. 300 (1919). The decision turned on an indictment which was held
not to charge a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act inasmuch as it alleged
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manufacturer, not having a monopoly,8 may sell or not sell to customers
according to pre-announced policies-including price maintenance.9  But
the realm of legality demonstrated by Colgate-in contrast to the prohibi-
tions of section i-was quickly narrowed. In United States v. A.
Schrader's Son, Inc.,10 the Court found that as soon as a manufacturer
forces another party to acquiesce to a plan of price maintenance, there is
an implied agreement violative of the act."1 Soon thereafter, FTC v.
Beech-Nut Packing Co.' 2 arose on facts quite similar to those of Colgate,
and the Court held them to constitute an "unfair method of competition." 's
More recently the case of United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.'4
demonstrated that conduct beyond a mere refusal to sell may violate the
Sherman Antitrust Act by coercing a combination with wholesalers who
cooperate either overtly or by acquiescence in the seller's plan. Colgate
thus stands as an extremely narrow exception to the basic proposition that
price maintenance is a violation of the act.15
no contract, combination, or conspiracy. Id. at 302. However, the factual context of
the case came far closer to, if not within, the prohibition of the act. Therefore, con-
fusion was unavoidably created as to whether the factual context would be tolerated
under a well-drawn indictment. See id. at 305.
8 See note 3 .supra.
9 "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman]
act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in
an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell." 250 U.S. at 307.
10252 U.S. 85 (1920).
11 Id. at 99-100. Defendant by use of its advantageous position in the market
sold only upon acceptance of what was a uniform contract with all buyers. The
district court's confusion demonstrates the problem caused by Colgate's procedural
context. Id. at 98. Cf. Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Pacldng Co., 256 U.S. 208
(1921). The lower court concluded that there were no written or oral contracts and
directed a verdict for the defendant. On appeal it was held that an implied contract
violates § 1 and that this might be found from the course of dealings. Id. at 210.
12257 U.S. 441 (1922).
13 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§45 (1958). This case did not arise under the Sherman Antitrust Act, yet the
standard of "unfair competition" used by the Court in this case is that of § 1 of the
act. However, there is some doubt as to whether the basis of the holding is sup-
pression of competitive freedom or implied contracts. Id. at 455. The distinction is
important where there is fair trade legalization of contracts so that the contractual
illegality is excepted from the act; but where there are coercive methods, the fair
trade laws are incapable of exculpating any resulting combination.
14 321 U.S. 707 (1944). The system of distribution here was designed to limit
sales unless the retailers abided by defendant's policy.
15 See Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
This case demonstrates the limited area in which Colgate operates, especially in a
monopoly context. Id. at 626. See also A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp., 272 F.2d 1
(7th Cir. 1959) (refusal to sell for failure to maintain resale price and some coercion
in this respect causes violation of § 1 by implied contract with those to whom sales
continue). See generally Comment, Refusal to Sell: A Means of Achieving Resale
Price Maintenance in Non-Fair-Trade States, 36 TFx. L. Rav. 799 (1958) ; Comment,
Resale Price Maintenance and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. CHL L. Rav. 369 (1951) ;
Comment, Refusals to Sell and Public Control of Competition, 58 YALE L.J. 1121
(1949). Compare HEATrcoTE-WILIAMs, ROBERTS & BaRsmN, REsTRiCTV TRADE
PRACTICES AND MONOPOLIES (1956). Note especially the discussion in an English
context of problems similar to Colgate. Id. at 82-89.
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A second exception to the declared illegality of resale price main-
tenance is that granted by legislation to fair trade laws.' 6 The federal
government has never enacted a positive fair trade law in the sense of
categorically permitting resale price maintenance; it has, however, enabled
states to act by allowing their fair trade statutes an exemption from the
antitrust laws.' 7 The basic provision of the federal exemption is that
vertical price maintenance agreements on identifiable products, when
such agreements conform to state laws, do not violate section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. There is an incidental horizontal aspect to these
contracts in that a nonsigner with notice may be bound by the agreement; 18
thus, insofar as the wholesaler or retailer is the party who in fact seeks
the institution of the agreement, he is clearly restraining competition among
his competitors. Forty-six states availed themselves of the federal sanction
by enacting fair trade laws; sixteen, however, have either judicially or
legislatively invalidated them subsequent to enactment.' 9 • At the current
time, there is before Congress a true federal fair trade act, the Harris
bill,20 which is sponsored by the National Association of Retail Druggists.
In fair trade jurisdictions the price-fixing statutes may mitigate the
effect of any limitations placed on the Colgate doctrine inasmuch as the
contractual arrangements permitted under these laws-enforceable resale
price maintenance and nonsigner clause horizontal restraints on competi-
16 See ATify GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 149-55 (1955); De Bevoise,
Problems of Pricing, in AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK (1958); Herman, Fair Trade:
Origins, Purposes, and Competitive Effects, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 621 (1959);
MacLachlan, A New Approach to Resale Price Maintenance, 11 VAND. L. REv. 145
(1957) ; Fulda, Resale Price Maintenance, 21 U. CmI. L. REv. 175 (1954) ; Schactman,
Resale Price Maintenance and The Fair Trade Laws, 11 U. Pi'r. L. REv. 562 (1950) ;
Williams, Resale Price Maintenance and Minimnm Price Legislation, in 1950 INSTI-
TUTE ON ANTITRUST LAWS AND PRICE REGULATIONS 141; A Symposium on the Fair
Trade Laws, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 68 (1958); Note, 3 SYRAcUSE L. REv. 144 (1951);
Note, The Enforcement of Resale Price Maintenance, 69 YALE L.J. 168 (1959);
50 COLUM. L. REv. 1144 (1950). See generally KRONSTEIN, MILLER & SCHWARTZ,
MODERN AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW (1958); FTC REP. ON RESALE PRICE MAIN-
TENANCE (1945).
1 Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1958); McGuire Bill, 66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(3) (1952).
I8 This is true only of the McGuire Bill. Specific provisions legalizing non-
signer clauses were necessitated by the Supreme Court's holding that nonsigners
could not be compelled, under the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, to maintain prices.
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). See Pepsodent
Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1944), for legislative history of the
Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act and its interaction with state laws.
19 H.R. REP. No. 467, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 3 n.1, 6-7 (1959). See Herman,
supra note 16; Schactman, supra note 16, at 570-76 for a useful tabulation of various
state statutes.
20 H.R. 1253, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). The bill would permit manufacturers of
identified merchandise to establish and control resale prices of goods in interstate com-
merce merely by notifying distributors of the manufacturer's price schedule. The bill
is comprehensive in scope, encompassing the entire United States including the Dis-
trict of Columbia. See also H.R. REP. No. 467, supra note 19. Note especially the
minority views of Mr. Dingell wherein the present defendant is specifically considered.
However, the legislation will not be acted upon by Congress this session. See Time,
May 2, 1960, p. 85.
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tion-are dearly more effective instruments for price maintenance 2 1 than
the unilateral refusal to sell.22 On the other hand, outside fair trade juris-
dictions, Colgate's importance as the sole exception to the general section 1
proscription of price maintenance is obvious. It is in these areas that
the instant case has a profound and direct effect.23 It would now seem that
the definition of unilateral action has been factually narrowed so that con-
ditioning sales on refusals to sell at lower levels of distribution constitutes
an "arrangement," 24 and therefore goes beyond merely exercising the
right to select one's own customers. The right to refuse to sell is, for the
Court, a "countervailing consideration" 25 to the sweeping prohibitions
against price maintenance which cannot prevail where the seller involves
others in enforcing his policy of refusing sales to price-cutters. In addi-
tion, a vacillation between refusals to sell and reinstituted sales upon a
compromise condition negotiated in discussions with the buyer now renders
probable a finding of combination.26  Communication would seem best
restricted to form letters, avoiding personal contact and its implications
of coercion and compromise. The instant case points up the anomaly
resulting from an attempt to reconcile Beech-Nut's condemning and Col-
gate's condoning the same conduct. The refusal to sell has become a
narrow doctrine fraught with danger of violating the Sherman Antitrust
Act: the Colgate doctrine is apparently effective only when the methods
used are ineffective. 27  The logical conclusion of the Court's reasoning
in the instant case was in fact reached earlier by the Seventh Circuit in
A. C. Becken Co. v. Gemex Corp.,28 where a properly unilateral refusal
to sell to those not assenting to conditions was sufficient to ground a find-
ing of illegal combination between the defendant and those to whom it
continued to sell.
If the instant case represents not merely a factual narrowing of what
constitutes unilateral action but rather is a declaration that even unilateral
action may result in a coerced combination,29 the decision is relevant within
21 "On the other hand, the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Com-
mission in numerous past official policy procurements [sic] have registered adamant op-
position to 'Fair Trade' as incompatible with the Nation's antitrust policy of fostering
free competition." Arr'Y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REx'. 153 (1955).22 For a criticism of the logic of the Colgate exception to proscription of price
maintenance, see Comment, 36 TEXAS L. Rxv. 799 (1958).
23 See authorities cited note 19 supra for the geographic scope of the opinion.
24 Instant case at 45.
25 Instant case at 44.
26 Instant case at 35-36, 46-47. These discussions with retailers on their adver-
tising of cutrate prices and the resultant change in policy give an impression of an
agreed upon compromise in violation of the act.
2 7 Compare George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 28 U.S.L.
WEEK 2569 (2d Cir. May 3, 1960) : "The Colgate principles have not been completely
destroyed. The Supreme Court has left a narrow channel through which a manu-
facturer may pass even though the facts would have to be of such Doric simplicity
as to be somewhat rare in this day of complex business enterprise."
28 272 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1959).
29 The instant case is not clear whether the violation is coercive or contractual
in that the opinion reads "the program upon which Parke Davis embarked to promote
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fair trade jurisdictions as well as in nonfair trade states.30 Such conduct,
coercive in nature, would not become legal by virtue of the contract excep-
tion to the antitrust laws contained in fair trade statutes 31-especially if
the fair trade exemption is strictly construed as applying only to contract
enforcement.3 2 While the majority opinion may be read as holding Parke,
Davis' conduct illegally contractual, Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, seems
to view it as unilaterally coercive inasmuch as he sees a clear violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act without analyzing what constitutes the required
combination or conspiracy.33 The ambivalence of the majority opinion is
clearly pointed out by the dissent, which questions the continuing vitality
of Colgate and asks whether the need for "countervailing considerations"
to offset Parke, Davis' conduct does not make legality turn on social policy
rather than on the absence of the concert of action required by sections 1
and 3. The dissenters contend that the Court has relegated Colgate to
a meaningless exception to an overall proscription of price maintenance.3 4
But a narrow reading of the decision does not abandon the Colgate doc-
trine, although the newly limited right to refuse to sell will little avail most
companies so large that their doings are of interest to the Attorney General.
And a conclusion that conduct previously condoned under Colgate remains
unilateral and nevertheless illegally coercive would not only abandon that
saving doctrine but also encroach upon fair trade rights to price main-
tenance. Furthermore, the fair trade exemption from the antitrust laws
is legislative and not properly subject to such judicial limitations as may
be imposed on the judicially created Colgate rule. Whatever the wisdom
of the fair trade exemption,35 it is entitled to the same reasoned construc-
tion given other congressional enactments and should not be rendered in-
effective by holding illegal all unilateral enforcement except court contract
actions. The legislative pattern thus dictates reading the instant case as
only a factual narrowing of what action is unilateral.
general compliance with its suggested resale prices plainly exceeded the limitations
of the Colgate doctrine and under Beech-Nut and Baush & Lomb effected arrange-
ments which violated the Sherman Act." Instant case at 45. (Emphasis added.)
30 Wall Street J., March 1, 1960, p. 2, col. 3.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945)
(coercion into fair trade illegal).
32 "The department [of justice] has further stated it to be its belief that if its
Antitrust Division had sufficient men and money to examine every resale price
maintenance contract written under State and Federal legislation, and to proceed in
every case in which the arrangement goes beyond the authorizations of the Tydings-
Miller [sic] Amendment, there would be practically no resale price maintenance
contracts, and that, in the absence of such wholesale law enforcement, the system
of resale price legislation fosters restraints of trade such as Congress never intended
to sanction." FTC, op. cit. supra note 16, at LXT. "Exact compliance with the
Miller-Tydings provision is necessary to avoid violation of the federal anti-trust
acts." Williams, supra note 16, at 156. But cf. Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge
Distrib. Co., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951) (broad interpretation of the Miller-Tydings
exception to § 1).
33 Even though the district court found the conduct unilateral, Mr. Justice
Stewart finds "no occasion to question, even by innuendo, the continuing vitality of
the Colgate decision." Instant case at 49 (concurring opinion). See note 5 supra.34 Instant case at 57 (dissenting opinion). See note 5 supra.
a5 For a discussion of the conflict between antitrust philosophy and allowance
of price maintenance, see 50 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1144 (1950). See also note 21 supra.
